A continuous-time version of the multivariate stopping problem is considered. Associated with vector valued jump stochastic processes, stopping problems with a monotone logical rule are defined under the notion of Nash equilibrium point. The existence of an equilibrium strategy and its characterization by integral equations are obtained. Illustrative examples are provided.
Introduction
In social life or in business, group decision making is often alleviated by cooperating with each individual's opinion in the whole group. How can we impose their opinion to the group decision? As one abstraction of such a situation, we shall try to propose a multivalued stopping game by introducing a monotone logical function to sum up each individual's opinion. The discrete-time case has already been discussed [4] , [10] . Here we consider the continuous-time case, which is formulated as a multiobjective extension of Karlin's model [3] and a rule's extension of Sakaguchi's model [7] . As a related result, Presman and Sonin [6] have obtained the multiperson best choice problem on the Poisson stream but their rule of a decision to stop is different from ours. Szajowski and Yasuda [8] treat the case when the process is a Markov Chain.
The situation of our problem is as follows. A group of p players observes a pdimensional stochastic process. Each player can decide to stop or to continue the process at any time when the p-dimensional successive offers will have happened, and the individual declarations are summed to make the group decision for the process by using a monotone logical rule. When the process is stopped by the group of p players, components of the stochastic process are given to each player as a reward, so that he wishes to make his expected gain as large as possible.
First, we introduce some definitions and notations to formulate our stopping problem in Section 2. Then, by preparing several lemmas, we show the existence of an equilibrium stopping strategy and obtain its characterization by an integral equation in Section 3. In Section 4, examples of the underlying model are given.
Formulation
We consider a p-dimensional vector valued stochastic process {X t ; t ≥ 0} with ith component X i t , adapted to F t on a probability space (Ω, F, P ) where F t is the σ-algebra generated by {X s ; 0 ≤ s ≤ t}. Let us assume that the process {X t ; t ≥ 0} is an independent jump process (see, Feller [2] ), that is, there are two independent stochastic sequences
. . , Z p n ) and τ n , n = 0, 1, 2, . . . , which satisfy X t = Z n if τ n ≤ t < τ n+1 for any t, t ≥ 0, under the following assumption: (c)
In order to denote the declaration for each player i(i = 1, . . . , p), when the process is 
A monotone logical rule includes a wide variety in a choice system such as a unanimity rule, an equal/unequal majority rule, and a hierarchical rule, some of which are given in the last section. For example, if no less than r (≤ p) members in a group of p players declare to stop, the group decision is to stop the process (equal majority rule). That is, π(σ
Refer also to our previous papers [4] and [10] .
For a strategy σ, a monotone logical rule π and a planning horizon T , a stopping time t(T, σ, π) for the group of p players is defined by
means the first time that the declaration σ i of each player i is summed up for the group of p players, to stop the process by the rule π. Since the monotone logical rule π is fixed, π is suppressed in t (T, σ, π) hereafter.
An expected reward of player i for a strategy σ is defined by
Since the problem is fundamentally formulated as a noncooperative game, a notion of Nash equilibrium point (see Nash [5] and Vorob'ev [9] ) can be utilized. A strategy
In this chapter, we will find an equilibrium strategy * σ and the corresponding stopping time t(T, * σ, π) given a monotone rule π.
Lemmas and Theorems
In this section, the existence of an equilibrium strategy and its characterization are obtained. First, we will derive the integral equation of u(T, σ) = (u
. . , n − 1 and τ n for each n.
where I A is the indicator for a set A. Proof. By Assumption 2.1, it holds that
for some n and that
So, the proof is completed by noting
) be a p-dimensional random variable whose distribution is F and let F be the σ-algebra generated by Z. For any set A ∈ F and any α ∈ R, define the operators
where
Thus, noting {t(
To show the existence of an equilibrium strategy, we need several further lemmas. Let S be the set of all {0, 1}-valued Borel measurable functions on
Proof. By Lemma 3.3, it holds that
so that (13.5) follows from (13.6). 
for T ≥ 0. Then, we have:
Proof. First we shall show the uniqueness of the solution of (13.7). Let α = G • v(T ) and α = G • v (T ), where v(T ) and v (T ) are two solutions of (13.7) in L 1
([0, ∞), dG).
We generally assume α ≥ α . Then, since
It follows from (13.7) that v(T ) − v (T ) ≤ α − α . Thus, we have 0 ≤ v(T ) − v (T ) ≤ G • v(T ) − G • v (T ) from Lemma 4.4, which implies
By the well-known Gronwall-Bellman's theorem (see, e.g. Bellman [1] ), we obtain the result
. Next, we shall show the existence of the solution of (13.7). For any strategy σ it holds from Lemma 3.2 that
(13.8)
Then we observe from Lemma 3.3 that
If we define, recursively, for each n ≥ 2, , ∞), dG) . Clearly, (ii) holds from (13.9) and (13.11).
2
. . , p, which satisfy the following p simultaneous integral equations: 
We are now ready to prove the main theorem.
Theorem 3.1. Under Condition 1, it holds that:
(ii) * σ is an equilibrium strategy.
Proof . 
denotes the set of all bounded Borel measurable functions on [0, ∞). This result is used as the example in the next section. In fact, we define the map
Then, by the same way as in the proof of Lemma 3.5, we get
The above discussion shows that U is a contraction w.r.t. the norm || · || T , so that U has a unique fixed point
Since T is arbitrary, v := lim T →∞ v T satisfies (13.12). Also, the uniqueness of the solution of (13.12) follows from Lemma 3.5. 
Then we can prove in identical fashion that for a solution
. . , p, of (13.13) the same theorem as Theorem 3.1 holds.
Remark 3.4. When G is a degenerate distribution with total mass at unity, the integral equation (13.13) becomes 
) for each k = 0, 1. We note that (13.16) corresponds to (3.1) of [10] .
Examples
In this section, we provide some examples involving the two-person stopping problem (p = 2) with the unanimity and simple majority rule as the typical ones of a monotone logical rule. 
which corresponds to (10) of Sakaguchi [7] . 
v(T − s) G(ds).
Then, we have from Assumption 2.1 that µ F = R xF (dx) < ∞,
Since By taking the derivative of both sides of (13.22) with respect to T , we have the following differential equation: which are the threshold of the control-limit strategy and the expected reward for the infinite horizon problem (refer to Table 3 .1 of [10] for the discrete time case) .
